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7.1  Introduction 
The U.S. system for taxing the income earned by the foreign subsidiaries of 
U.S. corporations defers taxation of foreign income until it is brought back to 
the United States and provides a credit for foreign taxes paid.’ Under this credit 
and deferral system, the two main forms of repatriation tax that a firm incurs 
on income remitted from a foreign subsidiary are the residual home-country 
tax liability (if any) not offset by  the foreign tax credit, and any withhold- 
ing tax imposed by  the source country. An open question in the literature on 
the taxativn of multinational corporations is, do these repatriation taxes influ- 
ence whether the profits of  foreign subsidiaries are repatriated or reinvested 
abroad? 
Theoretical arguments by  Hartman (1985) suggest that, under a credit and 
deferral tax system, the repatriation tax on foreign-source income is irrelevant 
to the investment and dividend payment decisions of foreign subsidiaries that 
are financed through retained earnings (“mature” subsidiaries). Hartman’s in- 
sight was that, since the repatriation tax is unavoidable, it reduces the opportu- 
nity cost of investment and the return to investment by the same amount. As a 
result, the tax does not affect a mature subsidiary’s choice between reinvesting 
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1. The subpart F  provisions of the tax code provide for accrual-basis taxation on certain for- 
eign income. 
63 64  Rosanne Altshuler, T. Scott Newlon, and William C. Randolph 
its foreign earnings and repatriating funds to its parent.* The results of recent 
empirical work that used cross-sectional data on U.S. multinationals seem to 
contradict this re~ult.~  These studies indicate that  dividend remittances are 
sensitive to repatriation taxes. This presents a puzzle. 
Hartman’s analysis is based on the assumption that taxes on dividends are 
constant over time. In a recent study (Altshuler, Newlon, and Randolph 199% 
we find that the empirical evidence can be reconciled with the theoretical re- 
sults by  recognizing that repatriation taxes on dividends may vary over time. 
This variability provides firms with an incentive to repatriate relatively more 
profits from a subsidiary when the tax cost of repatriation is temporarily low 
relative to the expected future tax cost. Likewise, they  would retain more 
profits when the tax cost of repatriation is higher than the expected future tax 
cost. Such timing behavior would cause studies that use cross-sectional data to 
find a relationship between dividend payout levels and the current tax cost of 
dividend payments. However, the actual relationship would be between divi- 
dend payout levels and the current level of the tax cost relative to its expected 
future level. 
If  timing opportunities are important to dividend payout decisions, then it 
becomes difficult to interpret the tax effects estimated in previous papers. By 
using the current tax price of dividend repatriations as an explanatory variable, 
these estimates will tend to confuse the effects of permanent changes in current 
and future repatriation taxes, as would occur due to changes in statutory tax 
rates, with the effects of tax changes due to transitory changes in the situation 
of the taxpayer. In Altshuler, Newlon, and Randolph 1995, hereafter A-N-R, 
we use a data set containing U.S. tax return information for a large sample of 
U.S. corporations and their foreign subsidiaries to estimate separate effects for 
the permanent and transitory components of the tax price of dividend repatria- 
tion. We find that the permanent tax price effect is significantly different from 
the transitory price effect and is not significantly different from zero, while the 
transitory tax price effect is negative and significant. Our results imply that the 
2. Note that this result does not imply that home- and host-country taxes have no effect on the 
repatriation decision. They do have an impact due to their effect on home- and host-country after- 
tax rates of return, but not through the tax on repatriation. This analysis is essentially an application 
of the “new view” or “tax capitalization view” of dividend taxation put forward by  King (1977), 
Auerbach (1979), and Bradford (1981). The “new view” holds that taxes on dividends (if constant 
over time) have no distortionary effects on the real decisions of domestic corporations. Although 
Harunan’s analysis pertains to the residual U.S. tax on foreign income, it applies equally well to 
withholding taxes. 
3. Mutti (1981) found significant tax effects in estimates of the parameters of a dividend equa- 
tion using U.S. tax return data from 1972. Hines and Hubbard (1990) used 1984 tax return data of 
a large sample of U.S. corporations and their foreign subsidiaries and found significant evidence 
of tax effects on income repatriation. Altshuler and Newlon (1993) used U.S. tax return data from 
1986 to investigate tax  effects on dividend remittances from foreign subsidiaries to their US. 
parent corporations. This paper improved upon previous work by providing a more accurate speci- 
fication of the tax incentives facing firms. Results from estimates of dividend equations indicated 
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previous empirical work has measured the effect of timing behavior and does 
not, therefore, contradict the prediction of Hartman’s model. 
This paper summarizes the research methodology and results of  A-N-R. 
Section 7.2 briefly discusses the tax consequences of  dividend repatriations 
and explains how the tax consequences can vary over time. The econometric 
method used to separate permanent from transitory tax price effects is pre- 
sented in section 7.3. The data set is briefly described and results are summa- 
rized in section 7.4.  The policy implications of this work are discussed in the 
final section of the paper. 
7.2  The Tax Price of Dividend Repatriations 
We define the tax price of a dividend remittance as the additional global tax 
liability arising from an incremental dollar’s worth of  dividend repatriations. 
To derive the tax price, we must take into account both the incremental U.S. 
and source-country  taxes on a dollar of dividends. The appendix to this volume 
describes the general features of U.S. taxation of the foreign income of multi- 
national corporations. The foreign tax credit generated by  a dividend remit- 
tance from a foreign subsidiary is calculated by grossing up the dividend to 
reflect foreign taxes deemed paid on the income underlying the dividend!  Sup- 
pose that subsidiary i makes a dividend payment, D;,  to its parent corporation. 
The grossed-up dividend is 
D; + TD,/(yI -  T), 
where  denotes the total foreign income tax paid by  subsidiary i and  yI de- 
notes the subsidiary’s pretax income from the U.S. perspective. Equation (1) 
can be rewritten as Di/(  1 -  T~),  where T~  represents the average subsidiary tax 
rate, T)yI, on foreign earnings from the U.S. perspective. The U.S. tax on the 
dividend before credits is TD;/(l -  T;),  where T denotes the U.S. rate of tax. 
The foreign taxes creditable against U.S. tax liability are deemed-paid taxes 
plus withholding taxes, or 
where w; denotes the withholding tax rate in the host country. If  the parent has 
excess credits, any U.S. tax liability on a dollar of dividends is offset by the 
foreign tax credit. If  the parent has excess limitation, the U.S. tax liability 
equals 
(3)  (T -  T;)D,/(~  -  T~)  -  oiDt. 
4. For tax years beginning in 1987, the amount of foreign tax credit associated with a dividend 
payment is based on the accumulated value of earnings and profits. Although this changes the 
gross-up formula in the text, it is not relevant for our analysis, since our data is taken from years 
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To compute the global tax price, we add the source-country effect to the 
U.S. tax effect. Under a classical corporate income tax system, the only host- 
country tax consequences of  a dividend remittance are the associated with- 
holding taxes.5 If  the parent has excess credits, there is no U.S. tax conse- 
quence, and therefore the global tax price is mi.  Otherwise, the parent is in 
excess limitation, and the global tax price is (T -  TJ/(  1 -  T~).~  As indicated in 
the appendix to this volume, the foreign tax credit limitation operates to some 
extent on an overall basis. This means that excess credits accruing from one 
source of foreign income can often be used to offset U.S. tax (excess limita- 
tion) on foreign income from another source. As a result, the effect of repatri- 
ating foreign income from a particular source may  be positive, negative, or 
zero.7 
There are at least two different ways in which the tax price described above 
may vary over time. First, it may vary due to differences between the tax-base 
definitions of the United States and the host country of the foreign subsidiary. 
As mentioned above, the U.S. foreign tax credit is based on the average foreign 
tax rate of  subsidiary, where the average is calculated with respect to the U.S. 
definition of the tax base. Differences in tax-base definitions may vary over 
time, for example, if capital-cost allowances differ, causing the average foreign 
tax rate as defined by the United States to vary. This variation causes the for- 
eign tax credit allowed for a given dividend payment to vary over time as well. 
Such variations in the average foreign tax rate may be planned. For example, 
to the extent that the timing of deductions and credits is discretionary, a foreign 
subsidiary may shift them from years in which it is remitting income to years 
in which it is not remitting income, thereby maximizing the foreign tax credit 
and minimizing the tax price of repatriation.* 
5. For simplicity, we focus our discussion in this section on the derivation of the tax price of a 
dividend remittance from a foreign subsidiary operating in a country that uses a classical corporate 
tax system. In our empirical work, we also take details of host-country tax systems into account, 
since our sample includes subsidiaries that operate in countries with split-rate and imputation 
systems. The derivations of the tax prices for these types of  tax systems are discussed in detail in 
Altshuler and Newlon 1993. 
6. We neglect here the cases in which the parent corporation has tax losses, since, as in earlier 
papers by Hines and Hubbard (1990) and Altshuler and Newlon (1993), we include in our sample 
only those US. corporations with positive worldwide taxable income. They are excluded here for 
simplicity’s sake, since the carryover rules for tax losses and foreign tax credits can interact in 
ways that may complicate the incentives for income repatriation of these firms. 
7. This is called cross-crediting or averaging of foreign income. Congress has restricted cross- 
crediting by creating baskets of different types of foreign income, to each of which a separate 
foreign tax credit limitation applies. Before the 1986 Tax Reform Act, the period that our study 
covers, there were five separate baskets: (1) investment interest income, (2) domestic international 
sales corporation dividend income, (3) the foreign trade income of a foreign sales corporation, (4) 
distributions from a foreign sales corporation, and (5)  all other foreign-source income, which we 
will call general limitation income. The act decreased the potential for cross-crediting further by 
increasing the number of separate limitation baskets to nine. 
8. The method was a more useful tax-planning device for U.S. multinationals prior to the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986, when the foreign tax credit was calculated year by year. The act switched to 
a system in which the foreign tax credit is calculated based on the pool of previously unremitted 67  Impact of Repatriation Taxes on Dividend Remittances 
The second cause of variation in the tax price is movement, over time, by 
the parent company between the two foreign tax credit positions of  excess 
credit and excess limitation. As explained above, the tax price differs between 
the two sit~ations.~ 
7.3  An Empirical Model of Dividend Repatriations 
Previous work has estimated a simple regression model of dividend repatria- 
tions.’,  For subsidiaries that pay  a dividend, the model takes the following 
basic form: 
(4)  d = a, + a,P + br + XA + E, 
where d is the dividend payout, expressed as the ratio of subsidiary dividends 
to assets; P  is the current tax price of dividend repatriation;” r is the after-tax 
rate of return for the subsidiary; and X  represents several variable characteris- 
tics of the subsidiaries and parents, the most important of which is the age of 
the subsidiary.I2 
By using the current tax price, E  the above model may confound the poten- 
tially different effects of permanent and transitory components of the tax price 
and  overestimate the effect of  the permanent comp~nent.’~  Our empirical 
model generalizes equation (4)  to allow for differences in transitory and per- 
manent tax price effects: 
(5)  d = a, + a,(P -  P*)  + a,P*  + br + XA + E, 
where P*  is the permanent component of the tax price, and hence (P  -  P*)  is 
the transitbry component.I4  We estimate the model in a slightly different form: 
foreign earnings and uncredited taxes, and, therefore, shifting the year in which tax credits and 
deductions are taken has much less effect on the foreign tax rate for U.S. foreign tax credit pur- 
poses. 
9. Altshuler  and Newlon (1993) found that  a significant proportion  of  U.S. multinationals 
switched credit positions during the 1980s. 
10. See Hines and Hubbard 1990; Altshuler and Newlon 1993. 
11. Altshuler and Newlon (1993) also use a measure of the “expected” tax price that attempts 
to take into account the fact that excess foreign tax credits can be carried back to several prior 
years or forward to several future years to offset taxes in those years. 
12. Some theoretical literature (such as Newlon 1987 and Sinn 1990) suggests that older subsid- 
iaries should have higher dividend payout ratios. This prediction is a direct consequence of the 
value of deferral when there is a repatriation tax;  that is, if there is deferral, then dividend payouts 
will on average be an increasing function of age, other things constant. 
13. In particular, a transitory decrease (increase) in the tax price reduces the current tax price 
relative to future tax prices, and thus enables the firm to increase the value of its foreign source 
income by accelerating (delaying) dividend repatriations. But a permanent change in the tax price 
does not change the relative prices of current and future repatriation. Therefore, one would expect 
dividend repatriations to be affected more by transitory than by permanent changes in tax  prices. 
14. In using “permanent” and “transitory,” we are adopting a convenient shorthand for talking 
about the expected future tax price and how it differs from the current tax price. Note that the 
expected future tax price may change over time, so it is not really permanent. Holding the transi- 68  Rosanne Altshuler, T.  Scott Newlon, and William C. Randolph 
(6)  d = a, + a,P + (az -  a,)P* + br + XA + E. 
One difficulty in estimating equation (6)  is that the permanent component 
of the tax price, P*, is not observed. To capture the effect of P*, we use an 
instrumental variables approach in which we instrument the tax price on a vari- 
able, P,  that we expect to be correlated with the permanent component of 
the tax price but uncorrelated with its transitory component. This essentially 
involves replacing P* in equation (6)  with its predicted value, 
B*  = 6, + 6,P + 6,r + xB, 
where the coefficients are derived from the regression 
P* = b, + b,P + bzr + XB + 6. 
In this paper, we use the country average tax price as an instrument for the 
permanent component of  the tax price.’* By  using this method, we have as- 
sumed that variations in country average repatriation tax prices will be corre- 
lated with the permanent component of tax price variation, but uncorrelated 
with transitory variations.I6  In other words, the future tax price of repatriation 
from a particular subsidiary would be expected to be higher if the average price 
is higher when measured across all subsidiaries located in the same country. 
Because the average for each country is always calculated across more than 
twenty-five subsidiaries, regardless of whether dividends are paid from each 
subsidiary, the average would not depend on any particular parent’s temporary 
credt position or any particular subsidiary’s temporary level of  the foreign 
effective tax rate used for calculation of the foreign tax credit. In A-N-R,  we 
also experiment with using the statutory withholding tax rate as an instrument 
for the permanent tax price component. 
7.4  Results 
The data are described in more detail in A-N-R.  Briefly, the data are derived 
from corporate income tax returns (1  120 forms), the forms filed in support of 
foreign tax credit claims (1  118 forms), and the information returns filed for 
each foreign subsidiary controlled by a U.S. corporation (5471 forms). These 
data allowed us to match subsidiary-specific information on dividend remit- 
tory component constant, however, the coefficient of P*  allows us to predict the effect of a perma- 
nent change in the tax price. This is why it is called the permanent price. 
15. Our estimation strategy is similar to that of Burman and Randolph (1994), who used state 
tax rates as instruments to separate permanent from transitory effects of taxes on capital gains real- 
izations. 
16. We demonstrate that there is substantial variation across countries in mean tax prices in 
table 1 of A-N-R. We argue that the degree of variation we found across countries suggests that 
the average country tax price is a useful instrument, since the cross-country variation is presumably 
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tances and other financial variables with parent tax return inf0rmati0n.l~  De- 
tailed data from foreign tax credit forms and data from 5471 forms were avail- 
able only in years 1980, 1982, 1984, and 1986. After applying several screens 
to the data to eliminate observations for which the data were deemed unreli- 
able, we were left with a sample of 22,906 subsidiary-specific observations. 
Table 7.1 presents our main estimation results. We use a Tobit procedure for 
our estimation to account for the fact that only 28 percent of the subsidiaries 
pay any dividends. Column 1 presents the results of estimating the simple divi- 
dend model presented in equation (4), which incorporates only the current tax 
price of  repatriation. These results are similar to  those found in  previous 
work.I8  The coefficient of the current tax price is negative, statistically signifi- 
cant, and of similar magnitude to the estimates in previous papers.I9 
Column 2 presents the results of estimating the model in equation (6), which 
distinguishes between permanent and transitory tax price effects. To interpret 
the tax price coefficient estimates, recall that in equation (6) the effect of the 
transitory component of the tax price is captured by the coefficient of the cur- 
rent tax price, while the coefficient of the permanent tax price equals the differ- 
ence between the effects of permanent and transitory changes in the tax price. 
Thus, for column 2, the coefficient estimates in the first row of the table repre- 
sent transitory tax price effects, the second-row coefficient estimates represent 
the difference between the permanent and transitory tax price effects, and the 
coefficient estimates in the third row, which are sums of the coefficients in the 
first two rows, represent permanent tax price effects. 
The estimated effect of the transitory component of the tax price (in the first 
row) is negative and statistically significant. Furthermore, it is larger in abso- 
lute magnitude than the estimated effect from the model excluding the perma- 
nent tax price effect.20  This result implies that transitory variation in the tax 
price has a large effect on the incentive to repatriate income. 
The estimated difference between the permanent and transitory tax price 
effects presented in the second row of  column 2 is positive and statistically 
significant. This implies that the permanent component of  the tax price not 
only is significantly different from the transitory tax price effect but also, since 
the coefficient is positive, cannot have as large a negative impact on dividend 
repatriations. In fact, the estimated permanent tax price effect presented in the 
17. These data were supplemented by withholding tax rate information taken from the Price 
18. See Hines and Hubbard 1990; Altshuler and Newlon 1993. 
19. To gauge the economic significance of this coefficient, note that it implies that a reduction 
in tax price of one standard deviation (0.34) implies an increase in the overall dividend payout 
ratio (including those that pay dividends and those that do not) of about 0.004, which is equal to 
about 11 percent of the mean dividend payout ratio of 0.036. Thus, moving the tax price from one 
standard deviation above the mean to one standard deviation below the mean implies an increase 
in the dividend payout ratio equal to about 22 percent of the mean dividend payout ratio. 
Waterhouse tax guides and tax treaties. 
20. A Hausman test shows that this difference is statistically significant. 70  Rosanne Altshuler, T. Scott Newlon, and William C. Randolph 
Table 7.1  Tobit Model Estimation Results (dependent  variable: subsidiary 
dividends over assets) 
Without Permanent  With Permanent 
Right-hand Variables, Estimation Details  Tax Price  Tax Price 
Current (global) tax price 
Permanent tax pricea 













































Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
"Measures the difference between effects of changes in permant and transitory tax prices (transi- 
tory tax price = current tax price -  permanent tax price). 
bMeasures the effect of permanent tax price changes, holding the transitory tax price constant. 
third row is not significantly different from zero. These results provide support 
for the hypothesis that the dividend repatriation incentive is affected by transi- 
tory but not permanent changes in the tax price of repatriation. 
In A-N-R, we  also present the results from a series of  estimation experi- 
ments designed to test the specification and methods underlying the results 
shown in column 2. One test provides evidence that further supports our claim 
that the coefficient of the current tax price measures only responses to transi- 
tory price changes. For this experiment, we use two-year changes in the tax 
prices for each subsidiary to construct an instrumental variable for the current 
tax price. We  find that the results are essentially the same as in column 2. In 
another specification test, we  find that our main results are essentially un- 
changed whether we use country average tax prices, as in column 2, or country 
withholding tax rates to construct instruments for the permanent component 
of the tax price. This test provides a stronger test of, but does not reject, the 
fundamental prediction from Hartman's  model, because the withholding tax is 
purely a repatriation tax, whereas the country average tax prices may also vary 71  Impact of Repatriation Taxes on Dividend Remittances 
as a  result of  international differences in  effective tax  rates on  corporate 
income. 
7.5  Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Our results suggest that the tax price effects on dividend repatriations found 
in previous studies using the simple model of dividend repatriations apparently 
measure largely the effect of the timing of dividend repatriations designed to 
take advantage of intertemporal variation in tax prices. These timing opportu- 
nities may arise either endogenously, through tax planning that affects both tax 
prices and dividend payments, or through exogenously caused variations in tax 
prices. Therefore, although repatriation taxes seem to affect dividend repa- 
triation behavior, this is apparently only because tax prices vary over time. 
The observed behavior is thus reconciled with  the prediction of  Hartman’s 
model. 
The results presented here should not be construed to imply that the “perma- 
nent” levels of host and home-country income taxation do not affect dividend 
repatriation by  foreign subsidiaries. As predicted by  our results, host-  and 
home-country corporate taxation will affect the earnings reinvestment deci- 
sion, and hence the dividend repatriation decision, through their impacts on 
host- and home-country after-tax rates of return. The evidence from our study 
implies that host- and home-country taxation do not have any additional effect 
on repatriation through the permanent component of  the repatriation tax. 
These results may have policy implications. The most obvious implications 
relate to policies on dividend withholding tax rates. For example, many capital- 
importing cbuntries have considered lowering withholding taxes, either unilat- 
erally or in the context of bilateral tax treaty negotiations, to try to attract new 
equity investment. But some countries may have been inhibited by the fear that 
such a measure would lead to increased flight of the accumulated multinational 
equity “trapped” by existing high withholding taxes. According to our results, 
such fears are unfounded as long as the reduction in the withholding tax rate 
is viewed as permanent. Permanent changes in dividend withholding tax rates 
appear more likely to affect decisions about new equity investment, and do not 
appear to affect repatriation of equity accumulated from past earnings.21 
To the extent that our results are consistent with the Hartman model, they 
have implications regarding the incentive effects of the credit and deferral sys- 
tem that the United States uses to tax most foreign income of U.S. multination- 
als. In particular, if the repatriation tax does not affect the decision to repatriate 
dividends, then, at least as with regard to retained earnings, the incentives for 
21. If a reduction in withholding tax rates is perceived by multinational investors as a signal of 
more favorable and stable policies toward multinational investment, it may in fact increase rein- 
vestment of earnings. 72  Rosanne Altshuler, T. Scott Newlon, and William C. Randolph 
foreign investment out of foreign retained earnings are the same as they would 
be under a system that exempts foreign income from taxation. 
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